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We evaluate the impact of a major European state aid program for broadband deployment 
applied to rural areas in the German State of Bavaria in the years 2010 and 2011. Using 
difference-in-differences estimation strategies, we find that aided municipalities have – 
depending on broadband quality – a between 16.8 and 23.2 percent higher broadband 
coverage than non-aided municipalities. This increase in broadband coverage – closing the 
digital divide – results in an increase of on average seven employed individuals living in the 
respective aid-receiving municipalities while leaving the number of employed or self-
employed individuals or wages unaffected. We therefore conclude that an increase in 
broadband coverage through state aid prevents rural areas from depopulation, but does not 
contribute to a further closing of the economic divide in the form of creating new jobs.  
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1 Introduction  
The study of the interrelationship between various types of infrastructure investments and 
economic development has fascinated generations of researchers. While there appears to be 
little dispute on the positive impact of the general provision of infrastructures such as 
transportation or communication networks on employment, innovation and growth, the 
question of the socially optimal degree of network deployment in general and the most 
suitable financing options in particular are much more controversial.  
While historically the (seemingly) public good character of many infrastructures suggested 
their entirely public provision, the liberalization processes in many network industries in the 
1980s and 1990s broadened the financing options to entirely private or public-private 
investment projects. The public provision of infrastructures is more and more seen as limited 
to cases of market imperfections, i.e., situations in which market forces alone are unlikely to 
provide the socially optimal level of network deployment.1  
In the European Union, the belief in the strategic importance of broadband infrastructures for 
economic development has long been affecting policy making – most recently reflected 
prominently in the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for Europe.2 In working towards 
the envisaged goals – nationwide coverage of broadband above 30 Mbit/sec and 50 percent of 
the households in the EU to be subscribed to broadband above 100 Mbit/sec by 2020 – the 
European Commission first and foremost aims at strengthening the incentives of private 
companies to invest in both the deployment of broadband infrastructures and subscriptions 
through the design and implementation of appropriate regulatory frameworks.  
Since 2003, this general strategy includes the granting of state aid in cases of particular rural 
areas where the private investment incentives are considered insufficient due to the 
interference of large deployment costs and limited revenue potentials. In fact, between 2003 
and 2014, the European Commission has approved in sum 136 state aid applications3 of 
mostly regions – but also entire (smaller) countries – in the European Union for the 
deployment of broadband networks in rural areas aiming at closing the digital divide and 
triggering welfare enhancing externalities that are expected from a well-established 
broadband infrastructure as ‘general purpose technology’ (see Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 
1995).  
Aiming at evaluating the impact of such state aid programs for broadband deployment in rural 
areas, two consecutive general research questions suggest themselves: First, from an 
effectivity perspective, had the granting of state aid the desired direct effect; i.e., in the case of 
                                                     
1
  It should be noted here that the identification of the socially optimal level of network deployment is a 
complex and therefore error-prone process. For example, it cannot be ruled out that a state authority decides 
to provide funding for an extension of a certain infrastructure to rural areas and later learns that only a small 
fraction of the respective individuals are interested in using (and paying for) the respective infrastructure 
(thus suggesting an inefficient investment decision).  
2
  See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en (last accessed on 1 July 2016) for further information. 
3
  See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/telecommunications/broadband_decisions.pdf (last accessed on 1 
July 2016) for a full list of Commission decisions on State aid to broadband.  
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broadband aid, did the granting of financial aid to firms lead to an improved broadband 
coverage in the respective regions or municipalities (and to what degree)? Second, from an 
efficiency perspective, the broader question is raised whether the respective state aid scheme 
is socially desirable? In the case of broadband aid, such a broader assessment of social costs 
and benefits has to go beyond the direct effects of the aid and additionally has to take various 
(positive or negative) indirect effects of the granting of aid on, e.g., competition, trade, 
employment, investment or economic growth into account.4  
We are the first to assess the causal effects of one of such state-aid policies on a fine 
geographic scale. Particularly, we are interested in the effects of the state aid program for 
broadband deployment in the German State of Bavaria in the years 2010 and 2011 on 
broadband coverage (first stage effectivity question) and employment (second stage efficiency 
question). We concentrate on employment as second-stage outcome variable as it is, first, of 
key interest for public policy makers and, second, likely to react rather quickly to policy 
changes such as the granting of state aid and the deployment of broadband infrastructure. 
Applying a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation strategy on the basis of a matched 
sample of 1,845 aided and non-aided rural municipalities, we find with respect to the 
effectivity question that the aided municipalities have – depending on broadband quality – a 
between 16.8 and 23.2 percent higher broadband coverage than non-aided municipalities. 
Concerning answers to the subsequent efficiency question, we combine our DiD strategy with 
an instrumental variables (IV) strategy in order to estimate the effect of the state aid-induced 
increase in broadband coverage on employment. We find a significant and positive effect of 
the state aid program on employed individuals living in the respective aid-receiving 
municipalities; however, neither the number of employed measured at place of work or self-
employed individuals nor the average wages show any significant effect. We therefore 
conclude that an increase in broadband coverage attracts workers to live in these rural 
municipalities – or prevents them from depopulation, respectively – however, without 
attracting additional economic activity necessary to close the economic divide.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The second section presents a brief 
review of the existing literature on the economic impacts of telecommunications networks and 
broadband internet. It also contains a review of the literature on the impact of alternative 
public policies on broadband deployment. The third section continues with a description of 
the institutional structure of broadband state aid in the European Union in general and its 
implementation in the German State of Bavaria in particular. The fourth section provides a 
detailed characterization of our empirical strategy. The fifth section describes our data, 
followed by the presentation and discussion of our estimation results in section six. Section 
seven concludes the paper with a review of its main results and the identification of avenues 
for future research.  
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  Ideally, such an analysis will also have to consider a possible ‘beggar-thy-neighbor problem’ suggesting 
negative effects on total welfare. 
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2 Review of related literature 
The study of the economic impacts of telecommunications networks and broadband internet – 
together with the impact of alternative public policies on broadband deployment – has 
attracted a significant amount of research. For example, a recent survey by Bertschek et al. 
(2016) reviews more than 60 studies that econometrically investigate the effects of 
communication networks on economic growth, employment, regional development as well as 
productivity and firm/market performance. In the remainder of this section, we limit our 
review of the literature to, first, studies that quantitatively assess the impact of state aid 
(subsidies) on broadband deployment (Section 2.1) and, second, contributions related to the 
impact of broadband availability (or adoption) on employment as key outcome variable 
(Section 2.2).  
2.1 The impact of state aid on broadband deployment  
The impact of state aid on broadband deployment – i.e., the effectivity question – is only 
investigated by a few studies all making use of highly aggregated country-level data. 
Furthermore, the studies typically do not go beyond simple multivariate regressions. In an 
early contribution, Belloc et al. (2012) examine the impact of public policies on broadband 
adoption by utilizing a data set for 30 OECD countries that contains public funding measures, 
as well as the countries’ socio-economic and demographic conditions for the years from 1995 
to 2010. The authors find a positive and significant effect of demand-side policies – which is 
higher when the broadband adoption is already developed – while the effect of supply-side 
policies decreases as the broadband market moves into its later stages.  
Paleologos and Polemis (2013) also utilize data for 30 OECD countries for the years from 
1988 to 2010 in order to examine the impact of the regulatory environment on 
telecommunications investments and economic growth controlling for the industry structure 
and competition in the market. They find that the regulatory variable – as measured by the 
OECD Regulatory Reform Index – has a significantly positive effect on both the level of 
investments and economic growth in both the static and the dynamic model specifications.  
Montolio and Trillas (2013) measure how the level of broadband adoption is affected by the 
impact of regulation, the degree of centralization of regulatory decisions as well as industrial 
policy. The authors employ an industrial policy variable that stands as a proxy for public 
policies devoted to foster broadband penetration and is calculated as government subsidies to 
private and public companies as percentage of GDP. The authors utilize data sets for OECD 
and EU countries for the years from 1999 to 2006 and find positive, albeit insignificant, 
effects of subsidies in all model specifications.  
2.2 The impact of broadband deployment on economic outcomes 
Since we are primarily interested in employment effects, we concentrate the review on such 
contributions.5 Applying US county- or ZIP code-level data, Kandilov and Renkow (2009) 
and partly also Kolko (2012) find positive links between broadband (availability or adoption) 
and employment growth. Using a large Canadian data set on the municipality-level from 1997 
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  For a comprehensive review on various economic outcomes, see Bertschek et al. (2016). 
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to 2011, Ivus and Boland (2016) find a similar significantly positive impact of broadband 
availability on employment growth in rural areas as well as overall wage growth (particularly 
created by the service sector). Furthermore, as shown by Atasoy (2013) for county-level US 
data, taking into account differences in urbanization and workers’ skill levels suggest that the 
effect of broadband is significant mostly in rural areas and for high-skilled workers. The 
stronger impact on remote areas lends support to the notion that broadband can help these 
regions to catch up with more economically developed urban areas. Last but not least, Fabritz 
(2013) investigates the impact of broadband on economic activity in rural areas of Germany. 
Using panel data on broadband coverage in 8,460 West German municipalities from 2005 to 
2009, she finds a positive but limited relationship between local employment and local 
broadband infrastructure (with the effect being larger in rural municipalities). A 10 percentage 
point increase in broadband availability in rural areas is associated with a 0.09 to 0.15 
percentage points increase in the local employment rate.   
In addition to the effects on employment types and levels – investigated further in our 
empirical analysis below using micro-data on the municipality level for rural areas of Bavaria 
– recent quantitative studies also investigate a possible impact of broadband availability (or 
adoption) on wages and labor productivity of particularly high-skilled workers. In particular, 
for the US, Forman et al. (2012) find that diffusion of advanced Internet comes along with 
significant wage and employment growth only for locations with high IT use, high income 
and population density. Akerman et al. (2015) analyze the impact of broadband on labor 
productivity with Norwegian firm and worker data from 2000 to 2008 taking the workers’ 
skill levels into account. They find that broadband availability improves the labor market 
outcomes and marginal productivities of highly skilled/educated workers but has a detrimental 
effect on unskilled/uneducated workers. Since jobs for more skilled workers are typically 
better paid, broadband might therefore increase the wage gap. 
In sum, our review of the existing literature suggests that employment effects of broadband 
deployment are often found empirically – however, they tend to be rather small in size and 
often show some heterogeneity with respect to urban and rural areas on the one hand and low- 
and high-skilled workers on the other.  
3 Institutional background on broadband state aid 
In this section, we present important institutional background on the granting of broadband 
state aid. While Section 3.1 briefly describes the broadband state aid rules in the European 
Union6, Section 3.2 continues with a detailed characterization of the broadband state aid 
programs in Bavaria. 
3.1 Broadband state aid in the European Union 
According to Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
state aid is defined as “… any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in 
                                                     
6
  As one out of 16 states that constitute the Federal Republic of Germany, European laws and regulations apply 
to the State of Bavaria.  
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any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods …”. Granting state aid is generally prohibited 
unless it is justified by reasons of general economic development. To ensure that this 
prohibition is respected and exemptions are applied equally across the European Union, the 
European Commission is in charge of ensuring that state aid complies with EU rules. 
For the case of telecommunications and broadband infrastructures, the European Union has 
long recognized their strategic importance in promoting the key objectives of creating 
common European markets in general and fostering economic development in the Member 
States in particular. Most recently, in its Digital Agenda for Europe, the Commission 
therefore envisages concrete goals in the form of the nationwide coverage of broadband above 
30 Mbit/sec and 50 percent of the households in the EU to be subscribed to broadband above 
100 Mbit/sec by the year 2020. Although the Commission first and foremost aims at 
strengthening the incentives of private companies to invest in both the deployment of 
broadband infrastructures and subscriptions through the design and implementation of 
appropriate regulatory frameworks, since 2003, it explicitly allows the granting of state aid in 
cases of particular rural areas where the private investment incentives are considered 
insufficient due to the interference of large deployment costs and limited revenue potentials.  
In order to reach its self-imposed goal of ‘well-designed aid targeted at market failures in 
order to achieve growth-enhancing priorities’ (European Commission, 2012) – the 
Commission has adopted detailed broadband state aid rules which specify the conditions on 
how public funding could be provided for broadband deployment. According to the guidelines 
– originally adopted in 20097 and revised in 20138 – the Commission supports public funding 
for broadband network deployment in rural and underserved ‘white’ areas where no 
broadband infrastructure exists or where no plans by private investors to roll out such an 
infrastructure exist in the near future. In providing funds, member states should pursue 
genuine cohesion and economic development as main objectives (§40-42). In so-called ‘grey’ 
areas where only one broadband network operator is present, a more detailed assessment is 
required for state aid approval as market distortions become more likely in those areas (§44-
46). Finally, there is, in principle, no role for state aid in competitive ‘black’ areas with two or 
more existing broadband infrastructures (§43).  
3.2 Broadband state aid programs in Bavaria 
In the year 2007, the German State of Bavaria9 – consisting of 2,056 distinct municipalities – 
started the initiative ‘Broadband for Bavaria’ aiming at informing local municipalities on 
general possibilities to foster the deployment of broadband networks in rural areas. The 
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  European Commission (2009), Community rules for the application of state aid rules in relation to rapid 
deployment of broadband networks, Official Journal of the European Union 2009/C 235. 
8
  European Commission (2013), EU Guidelines for the application of state aid rules in relation to the rapid 
deployment of broadband networks, Official Journal of the European Union 2013/C 25. 
9
  In 2015, Bavaria generated a (nominal) GDP of about €550 billion making it the second largest German state 
after North Rhine-Westphalia (with a GDP of about €646 billion). Although part of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Bavaria therefore had a larger GDP than entire EU member states such as Austria (about €337 
billion in 2015), Belgium (about €529 billion in 2014) or Poland (about €545 billion in 2014). Data sources: 
Statistical Offices of the Federation and the Länder and World Bank. 
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initiative was motivated by a slower broadband deployment in Bavaria – compared to other 
German states – for reasons such as a lower population density, a high share of rural areas 
with numerous far-flung municipalities, and difficult topographical conditions with medium- 
and high-range mountains. Moreover, the divergence in broadband coverage between rural 
and urban regions was substantial.  
Guided by the aim of providing equivalent working and living conditions in the entire state, in 
November 2007, the Bavarian government decided to support the deployment of broadband in 
rural areas from the year 2008 onwards (see generally Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Media, Energy and Technology, 2012).  
Following this initiative by one federal state, the German Federal Government notified the 
European Commission about its intended policy to support rural areas all over Germany in the 
deployment of broadband infrastructure. By the end of the year 2008, the European 
Commission decided to raise no objections against the initiative allowing the Bavarian 
government to support each broadband deployment project in rural areas with aid of up to 
€200,000.  
However, after the state election in 2008, the Bavarian government decided in its coalition 
negotiations to increase the maximum amount of aid to €500,000 per municipality project. 
The respective proposal was approved by the European Commission on 19 May 2009. Due to 
the large number of subsequent applications by the majority of Bavarian municipalities, the 
government later decided to extend the program until the end of 2011 allowing all interested 
municipalities to apply for funding. Eventually, 1,300 municipalities received approval for 
funding by the end of 2011, i.e., about 63 percent of all Bavarian municipalities. The total 
funding amount provided by the public authorities added up to €107.6 million, i.e., about 
€83,000 per aided municipality. Funding was granted for feasibility studies and planning 
activities as well as for closing the profitability gap for network infrastructure deployment.  
Further information on the economic geography of broadband state aid is provided in Figure 1 
below by plotting the State of Bavaria as well as the state aid status of all of its municipalities 
– with ‘white’ indicating municipalities that did not receive any aid, ‘light blue’ flagging 
municipalities that received aid in the 2008 to 2009 period and ‘dark blue’ showing all 
municipalities that received broadband aid in the 2010 to 2011 period. As revealed by Figure 
1, the white areas are distributed all over Bavaria and do not show apparent concentrations in 
particular areas of the State.  
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Figure 1: Aided and non-aided municipalities in Bavaria 
Data Source: “Schnelles Internet für Bayern” 
In our empirical investigation below, we focus on the impact of broadband state aid granted 
by the State of Bavaria in the 2010 to 2011 period – basically because 87 percent of all aided 
municipalities received funding in this second aid period (marked in dark blue in Figure 1). 
Generally, the event window has to be long enough such that changes in broadband 
infrastructure deployment related to state aid can be captured; however, it must also be short 
enough to avoid confounding effects from other changes that are not under control. 
Accordingly, in defining our treatment period of 2010 and 2011, we excluded 171 
municipalities (i.e., about 8 percent of all Bavarian municipalities) to which state aid was 
granted during the first state aid program from 2008 to 2009 (marked in light blue in Figure 1). 
Overall, our sample consists of 1885 municipalities, from which 1129 are in the treatment and 
756 are in the control group of untreated municipalities.  
As the deployment of broadband infrastructure is rather time-consuming and subject to 
technical complexities related to network planning, regulatory and legal permissions (such as 
rights of way and, in particular, the state aid approval procedures themselves) as well as other 
institutional rigidities (such as negotiations with property owners), it can take place only 
gradually (see Briglauer, 2015). Accordingly, we do not expect any substantial network 
deployment activities in the same year when state aid was approved by the government. 
8 
4 Empirical strategy 
We employ a two-stage empirical approach that, in the first stage, aims at identifying the 
effect of state aid on broadband coverage in Bavarian municipalities that received approval 
(treatment) in the period from 2010 to 2011 (effectivity question). In order to achieve this, we 
employ a standard difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator as well as conditional DiD which 
is based on a matched sample of aided and non-aided municipalities (Section 4.1).10 In the 
second stage, we identify the effect of state-aid induced broadband deployment on 
employment using a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
method (Section 4.2, efficiency question). 
4.1 The impact of state aid on broadband deployment 
In order to quantify the effect of state aid on broadband deployment, we are first interested in 
estimating the following static equation (super indexed s) on the basis of municipality-level 
panel data: 
(1) _ℎℎ = 	 + 	 + 	 +	 + 	 +   
The outcome variable, _ℎℎ

, measures the share of household broadband coverage (i.e., 
availability on the supply side and not subscriptions on the demand side) in municipality i and 
in year t at various levels of bandwidth quality, super indexed q. 	 captures municipality-
specific fixed effects and  represents the error term of the static specification. Including 
municipality fixed effects already captures a large share of the variation in broadband 
coverage, since most of the supply and demand factors show low variation over time (see also 
Akerman et al., 2015, p. 1796). Equation (1) is estimated separately for the different quality 
levels.  is a binary variable that indicates whether a municipality received treatment (state 
aid approved, D1 = 1) in the funding period from 2010 to 2011. The variable  is also of 
binary nature and signals whether an observation belongs to the pre- or post-treatment period. 
 is equal to one for the period from 2012 to 2014 as the corresponding observations were 
measured after the treatment, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest, however, is 	, 
the coefficient of the interaction term, D1D2,	which is equal to one if the observation was 
measured after the treatment period and the observation was treated. Hence, the DiD 
coefficient, 	, directly captures the average treatment effect over the years 2012 to 2014. The 
vector 

 contains the following list of time-varying covariates (discussed further in 
Section 5 below):  
• Socio-structural: Working age structure, share of females 
• Geo-structural: Population density, accessibility of motorways and regional cities 
• Economical: Share of medium-sized firms, share of large firms, share of gross 
value added in secondary and tertiary sector 
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  Please note that this kind of conditional DiD estimator relaxes the key identifying assumptions as it combines 
both the advantage to abandon the linear assumption when controlling for observables and to control for 
unobservables exploiting the panel dimension of the data (see Heckman et al., 1998). 
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• Political: Vote shares of CSU (‘conservatives’) and SPD (‘democrats’) political 
parties in municipal elections 
Second, as we have several time periods available, we can model the dynamics of the 
treatment effect more flexibly. The ‘dynamic’ (super indexed d) DiD regression framework 
for municipality  and year  with quality  is specified analogously to equation (1) and reads 
as follows:  
(2) _ℎℎ















Instead of one interaction term in the static model, in the dynamic model, we have three 
interaction terms, one for each year after treatment. In equation (2),  can take three distinct 
values corresponding to the years 2012 to 2014. Accordingly, instead of one dummy variable 
capturing the entire period after treatment, in the dynamic model, we include three different 
dummies controlling for each year after treatment individually. This dynamic specification 
traces out the full adjustment path and thus relaxes the assumption that the policy impact is 
immediate or the same in every year. 
The key identifying assumption underlying the DiD estimator is that both, the treated as well 
as the untreated municipalities follow the same trend (‘parallel trends assumption’). In our 
regressions, we include a large number of covariates to control for factors that might lead to 
different trends across the two groups after treatment. To ensure that the treatment and control 
group municipalities are even more likely to show the same trend over time, we also relate the 
DiD estimator to a matched sample obtained from a propensity score matching (PSM) 
procedure. For PSM we include the same set of controls to capture pre-existing initial 
conditions measured in 2010 and additionally include the following list of controls where we 
have pre-treatment information to further address the omitted variable bias at the municipality 
level: 
• Socio-structural: Number of households in 2010 
• Geo-structural: Type of municipality in 2010 
• Economical: Development of average rents in the years 2007-2009 
• Initial broadband conditions: Average annual growth rate in coverage of 1 Mbit/s 
in the years 2007 to 2009, availability of 2, 6 and 16 Mbit/s in 2010 
Matching is a non-parametric estimation method and thus one of its main advantages is that it 
does not rely on a particular specification of functional forms and distributional assumptions 
about the error term as is the case in ordinary regression methods including DiD regression 
frameworks. The broadest possible average causal effect is the average treatment effect (ATE) 
which averages across all municipalities. The ATE represents an estimator that can be applied 
to a sample drawn from a larger population where each individual observation is considered. 
However, in most policy contexts, the particular interest is on the ATT for whom the policy 
treatment was designed. In deciding whether a policy was effective, the focus would then be 
on those municipalities who received the treatment but not on the average effect of all 
municipalities (see Heckman et al., 1997). In our case, the focus is thus on ATT, however, we 
10 
calculate both the ATT and the ATE in our treatment analysis as part of our robustness 
checks. 11  
Identification of the ATT requires that all (pre-treatment) covariates that influence treatment 
assignment and potential outcomes simultaneously have to be observed meaning that there are 
no omitted confounding covariates (see Sianesi, 2004). To ensure that causal effects of the 
main explanatory variables are measured, we address the omitted variable bias at the 
municipality level by including several time-variant control variables in our empirical 
analysis. The other main matching assumption, referred to as ‘overlap’ or ‘common support’, 
implies that there is overlap in both groups as for each treated municipalities there is another 
matched control group with a similar set of covariates 
4.2 Instrumental variable estimation of the impact of broadband infrastructure 
The second stage of our analysis focuses on the impact of broadband infrastructure on 
different employment-related outcome variables. Broadband infrastructure, however, is not 
deployed randomly, but likely to be correlated with economic prosperity in a certain region or 
municipality. Accordingly, broadband infrastructure might be correlated with the error term 
which yields biased and inconsistent estimates. To address this point, we make use of 
2SLS/IV estimation with two-way fixed effects in which we use the interaction term  as 
the external instrument for broadband coverage. This allows us to identify a causal effect of 
state aid on the outcome variable as the granting of state-aid solely for the purposes of 
broadband deployment has no direct or indirect – other than through broadband deployment – 
impact on the outcome variable. Accordingly, the second stage model of our empirical 
analysis reads as follows:  
(3) 			 "# = $ + %#_ℎℎ + #&%# + #& + '#& + (  
where IitY  is the relevant employment outcome (measured by indicator I) in municipality  in 
period . The outcome variable of the first stage, _ℎℎ

, is now the main explanatory 
variable of interest. Accordingly, the coefficient %
#
 indicates the impact of broadband 
coverage on employment outcome variables. Note, however, the estimated coefficients in the 
employment equations represent the impact of broadband availability on employment 
outcomes but not the effect related to actual broadband usage. Whereas the former measures 
the intention-to-treat effect, the latter directly impacts economic outcomes such as 
employment in particular and is a function of broadband availability. Accordingly, we 
estimate a reduced form where the estimated coefficients represent a proportional effect 
which is smaller than the effect via broadband usage (see Czernich, 2014). #& includes the 
set of covariates used in the first stage as well as education as a major employment specific 
covariate. #& and '#& represent the municipality fixed effects and period effects, respectively, 
and (

 is the additive error term. By multiplying the coefficient 		from the first stage with 
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  Please also note that the ATT and ATE estimators rest on different identifying assumptions (which are 
weaker for the ATT estimator, see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 864). 
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the coefficient %
#from the second stage, we can assess the causal effect (reduced form) of the 
state aid program on the respective outcome variable.  
5 Data 
Our empirical analysis makes use of several separate data sets: the GENESIS database12 and 
the INKAR13 database both provide most of our socio-structural, geo-structural, economic and 
political covariates; the ACXIOM14 data base provides information on the number of 
freelancers; the ‘Schnelles Internet für Bayern’6 database and the German Breitbandatlas15 
provide data on which municipality received state aid as well as broadband coverage. All 
variable definitions and sources are summarized in Table A.1 in the Annex. Table A.2 
provides the summary statistics. 
The time window for our analysis ranges from 2010 to 2014. The treatment, i.e., the approval 
of state aid for broadband deployment, took place between 2010 and 2011. In view of the 
institutional rigidities described in Section 3, we consider the year 2010 as pre-treatment. We 
do not evaluate the outcome variables with respect to the year 2011 as it can neither be seen 
as pre- nor as post-treatment. The years from 2012 to 2014 define our post-treatment period.  
5.1 Broadband availability in Bavarian municipalities 
Broadband availability in the years 2010 to 2014 is measured as the share of households in a 
municipality that have access to a particular bandwidth quality level. In our analysis, we 
measure standard broadband with three different levels of download speed, i.e., ≥ 2, ≥ 6, and 
≥ 16 Mbit/sec, denoted with HH_2MB, HH_6MB and HH_16MB. Since the state aid 
program was predominantly designed to provide a basic supply of broadband infrastructure, 
we concentrate on these low to medium speed levels.  
Figure 2 illustrates the development of bandwidth levels in our observation period. As shown 
in the left-hand graph, treated municipalities are developing faster than untreated ones and in 
the year 2012 overtake the untreated municipalities. The right-hand graph shows the same 
trend for the observations in the control group (instead of all untreated municipalities). 
Interestingly, the difference between treated and untreated (control) municipalities in the year 
2014 is even larger in the right-hand graph. 
                                                     
12  See https://www.statistikdaten.bayern.de/genesis/online (last accessed on 1 July 2016). 
13  See http://www.inkar.de/ (last accessed on 1 July 2016). 
14  See http://www.acxiom.de/ (last accessed on 1 July 2016). 
15  See http://www.zukunft-breitband.de/Breitband/DE/Breitbandatlas/BreitbandVorOrt/breitband-vor-ort_node. 




Figure 2: Development of broadband deployment in Bavaria 
Data Source: “Breitbandatlas” 
5.2 Employment in Bavarian municipalities 
We measure employment in a municipality by the number of employees with social insurance 
at place of residence (EMPL_RES) as well as place of work (EMPL_WORK) per 100 
residents. The number of employees with social insurance at place of residence measures the 
number of persons living in a given municipality having a job. The number of employees with 
social insurance at place of work measures the number of persons working in a given 
municipality. The variable EMPL_SELF measures the number of self-employed workers and 
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freelancers per 100 residents. Finally, we are also able to examine the impact of basic 
broadband infrastructure on the average workers´ annual gross wages (WAGE).  
In Figure 3 we show the development of employees with social insurance per 100 inhabitants 
at place of work and at place of residence. Treated municipalities show fewer employees 
measured at place of work than untreated municipalities in 2010. However, in 2012 and 2013, 
treated municipalities are found to overtake the untreated ones. Compared with employees at 
place of work, the distance between treated and untreated (control) municipalities is 
substantially larger for employees at place of residence and is more pronounced in 2014 than 
in 2010. In Figure 4 we depict the development of self-employed and freelancers per 100 
inhabitants and the annual gross wages. It appears that treated and untreated municipalities 
follow rather similar trends. In treated municipalities we observe less self-employed and 
freelancers than in untreated municipalities. This gap also does not close after the treatment 
period. A comparable development is found in the graph plotting annual gross wages.   
 
Figure 3: Development of employees with social insurance at place of work (left panel) and 
residence (right panel) in Bavaria 
Data Source: GENESIS 
 
Figure 4: Development of self-employed (left panel) and gross annual wages (right panel) in 
Bavaria 
Data Source: AXCIOM and GENESIS 
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5.3 Main explanatory variables and further covariates 
Our main explanatory variable for the treatment analysis on the first stage is a binary 
indicator (D1) which measures whether a municipality received state aid between 2010 and 
2011. We expect that municipalities receiving state aid have increased access to broadband 
which should become reinforced due to adjustment costs in the subsequent years.  
Regarding the second stage of our analysis, the main explanatory variable of interest is the 
available broadband infrastructure stock as described in Section 5.1. We expect that a higher 
broadband infrastructure stock induces positive externalities on major sectors of the economy 
including local labor markets. Accordingly, we expect that broadband deployment also comes 
along with positive net employment effects in aided municipalities.  
We distinguish five sets of covariates:  
Covariates controlling for the socio-structural dimension of a municipality are alongside with 
the proportion of working people (WORKING_AGE) and the share of females (FEMALE) in 
a municipality. The age structure is measured by the share of people between 18 and 65.  
The next set of covariates controls for geo-structural characteristics of a municipality. We 
include a municipality’s population density (POP_DENS) which captures average broadband 
deployment costs – characterized by so-called ‘economies of density’ leading to considerably 
higher costs in rural areas. Furthermore, densely populated areas tend to have thicker labor 
markets for relevant IT skill complementarities (see Forman et al. 2012). Transport 
accessibility is measured as the average journey time (by car) in minutes to the next public 
accessibility point in terms of the next motorway (ACC_MOTOR) and the next regional 
metropolitan area (ACC_CITIES). Rural municipalities with good public accessibility might 
grow faster and attract funding more easily in view of a lower profitability gap. Very remote 
municipalities in, e.g., alpine regions most likely, however, did not receive aid at all, as 
average deployment costs are simply too high to fall under the treatment scheme.  
We further collected economical covariates along the following dimensions: the size and the 
business segment of the local companies. Specifically, we include the share of medium 
(FIRM_MED) and large firms (FIRM_BIG) as well as the gross value added (GVA) in the 
secondary (GVA_SEC) and tertiary sector (GVA_TER), i.e., we can control for how 
important the production and service sectors are in comparison to the primary sector. 
Municipalities with a higher number of large firms and more pronounced secondary and 
tertiary sectors might have greater impact when claiming state aid. At the same time, local 
politicians might have an incentive to support economically underdeveloped areas in 
particular.  
We further control for the political dimension by incorporating the outcome of the last 
communal election. In particular, we control whether municipalities led by one of the two 
main parties in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), have been more successful in receiving aid. These variables can also be regarded as a 
proxy for how well a municipality is managed.  
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Our employment-specific control variable captures education (EDUC) measured as the share 
of school leavers with a higher education entry qualification in the total number of school 
leavers. 
Finally, in PSM we also consider the initial conditions in the period from 2007 to 2010:  
First, we control for the average yearly growth rate of coverage of 1 Mbit/sec between 2007 
and 2009 (GR_1MB). Second, we include the share of households that had access to at least 
2, 6 and 16 Mbit/sec in the year 2010 (HH_2MB, HH_6MB, HH_16MB). This ensures that 
pre-treatment units followed the same trend in the years directly preceding the granting of 
state aid and were – with respect to broadband availability – on the same initial level. Further 
covariates used for PSM are the number of households (HH) and the type of a municipality 
(TYPE_X) which provides a classification between 1 and 5 indicating a municipality´s degree 
of urbanization depending on the local infrastructure. Both covariates are available for the 
year 2010. The latest outcome of the communal election in Bavaria before our funding period 
refers to the year 2008. Finally, we have information on the average annual growth in rents 
per square meter (RENT) over the time period from 2007 to 2009.  
6 Estimation results 
In this section, we present our main results of the treatment analysis based on DiD 
approaches. Section 6.1 first discusses the results of the PSM procedure which serves as a 
prerequisite to delineate the sample for conditional DiD. Subsequently, we present the results 
of basic and conditional DiD in Section 6.2 (effectivity question). In both DiD variants, we 
analyze the immediate, i.e., static impact as well as dynamic effects of state aid policies. In 
Section 6.3, we then discuss the main IV estimation results as regards the impact of 
broadband infrastructure on employment (efficiency question). 
6.1 Propensity score matching 
Before coming to our DiD and IV estimation, we aim at making treated and untreated 
municipalities as similar as possible so that the common trend assumption is likely to hold. 
We do this by propensity score matching (PSM). In PSM, we consider the initial conditions in 
a municipality in the period from 2007 to 2010. First, we control for the average yearly 
growth rate of broadband coverage of 1 Mbit/sec between 2007 and 2009 (GR_1MB). 
Second, we include the share of households that had access to at least 2, 6 and 16 Mbit/sec in 
the year 2010 (HH_2MB, HH_6MB, HH_16MB). This ensures that pre-treatment units 
followed the same trend in the years directly preceding the granting of state aid and were – 
with respect to broadband availability – on the same initial level. Further covariates used for 
PSM are the number of households (HH), population density (POP_DENS), share of persons 
in working age (WORKING_AGE) and share of females (FEMALE) as well as the type of a 
municipality (TYPE_X). These covariates are available for the year 2010. The latest outcome 
of the communal election in Bavaria before our funding period refers to the year 2008. Here, 
we include the shares of votes gained by the two most popular parties CSU and SPD. Finally, 
we have information on the number of medium (FIRM_MED) and large firms (FIRM_BIG), 
the share of gross value added in the secondary (GVA_SEC) and tertiary sector (GVA_TER), 
the accessibility of motorways (ACC_MOTOR) and cities (ACC_CITIES), and the average 
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annual growth in rents per square meter (GR_RENT) over the time period from 2007 to 2009. 
We apply nearest neighbors matching with two and three nearest neighbors.  
Table 1 is a balancing table and shows the mean differences in broadband availably and 
covariates between treated and control municipalities before and after matching. We apply 
ordinary two-sample t-tests to check the balancing properties of our matching procedure. The 
tests examine whether the differences in means are different in treated and untreated groups 
before and after matching (H0: ‘means are equal for both groups’). For obvious reasons, 
matching is designed to ensure that for units with a similar propensity score the assignment to 
treatment is random and independent of the covariates. If this is satisfied then municipalities 
with a similar propensity score must have the same distribution of covariates independently of 
the treatment status. This balancing condition is testable through differences in means for 
each covariate. Table A.3 reports the mean tests applied to the whole sample, i.e., before 
matching is conducted. As expected, almost all means of the covariates are significantly 
different between treated municipalities (N = 1129) and untreated municipalities (N = 756). In 
contrast, one can infer from Table 1 that all covariates are well balanced after matching which 
holds for both control groups (NB = 2 and NB = 3). Therefore, and in line with the above 
tests, we are confident that our matching procedure was successful in identifying valid 
counterfactuals for the group of treated (i.e., state aid-receiving) municipalities. 
Table A.4 reports the results of the probit regression of the PSM approach assessments of the 
quality of the matching procedure refer to the performance measures of the probit model. The 
Pseudo R2 measures the explanatory power of the covariates and should be significantly lower 
after the matching procedure (see Sianesi 2004). Indeed, comparing the Pseudo R2 in Table 
A.4 (0.158) with the respective value of the probit regression after matching based on the 
sample of treated units and counterfactuals (0.003 for NB = 2 and 0.003 for NB = 3)16 
indicates that the systematic differences between both groups decreased substantially after 
controlling for covariates. Similarly, one can compare likelihood ratio tests on the joint 
significance of all covariates in the probit model before and after matching. As required, the 
null hypothesis (‘all covariates are jointly insignificant’) is rejected before (p = 0.000) but not 
after matching (p = 0.917 for NB = 2 and p = 0.875 for NB = 3).  
 
  
                                                     
16
  The underlying probit regressions are available from the authors upon request.  
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Outcome var.           
HH_2MB_ 2012 81.90 24.34  65.99 33.70  65.35 34.15 *** *** 
HH_2MB_ 2013 88.63 18.56  71.70 30.90  71.05 31.32 *** *** 
HH_2MB_ 2014 92.22 14.07  75.12 29.44  74.21 30.09 *** *** 




46.93 36.58 *** *** 




52.19 36.01 *** *** 




56.46 36.56 *** *** 




36.22 32.84 *** *** 




38.37 33.94 *** *** 




44.31 36.03 *** *** 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. H0: equal means for both groups. As the nearest neighbor matching procedure 
is performed with replacement, we impose Lechner´s variance approximation (Lechner, 2001). Due to the lack 
of common support, 52 municipalities had to be dropped resulting in a number of 1,077 treated municipalities. 
With two and three nearest neighbors, this corresponds to 2,154 or 3,231 observations in the control group, 
respectively. The numbers in parentheses in the heading of Table 1 indicate the number of real municipalities 
used in PSM. As we have less untreated than treated municipalities, we reuse municipalities in the control group 
for several treated municipalities. 
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6.2 First stage: The impact of state aid on broadband deployment 
Table 2: shows the estimation results of the static and dynamic DiD models on the basis of the 
whole (columns (1), (3) and (5)) and the matched sample of treated and untreated 
municipalities (columns (2), (4) and (6)). In order to take into account the fact that several 
non-treated municipalities are overrepresented in the matched sample due to replacement, we 
also applied weights in the DiD estimation. If a municipality from the control group was a 
neighbor for several treated municipalities, it accordingly receives a proportionally higher 
weight in the DiD estimation. Table 2: reports the average treatment effect (ATE) which 
averages across all municipalities (whole sample) and the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) for the matched sample. 
In the static model, the treatment effect is averaged over the years following the treatment. 
For instance, the ATT in column (2) is ~16.76, meaning that within the treatment group, the 
fraction of households which had access to at least 2Mbit/sec increased by 16.76 percentage 
points after the treatment. Regarding the ATT for 6 and 16 Mbit/sec, the ATT is – with about 
20 percentage points – even larger. Generally, the treatment effects are higher for 6 and 16 
Mbit/sec quality levels in all specifications. These findings appear to be reasonable as 
bandwidth of >= 2 Mbit/sec represented a very elementary quality level in the post-treatment 
period. Hence, it appears likely that funding was used to realize higher broadband levels, 
since in 2010 broadband with 2 Mbit/sec bandwidth has already been widely dispersed even 
in treated municipalities. 
The dynamic model reports the ATE/ATT for each year after treatment individually. All 
coefficient estimates indicate that there is a highly significant and positive treatment effect 
underlying all quality levels of broadband infrastructure. However, since some municipalities 
received treatment later, i.e., in 2011 instead of 2010, and in view of the gradual infrastructure 
deployment process, it appears unlikely that corresponding treatment effects have already 
been materialized completely within the first year of policy assessment, i.e., in 2012. Due to 
adjustment costs, potential impacts are rather expected in the following years 2013 to 2014. In 
line with these expectations, the treatment effect is strictly increasing over the years for each 
broadband quality level and for both specifications (based on the whole and matched sample 
only). For instance, for the speed of 6 Mbit/sec, the treatment effect for the matched sample 
(column (4)) increases from ~18.75 percentage points in 2012 to ~23.52 percentage points in 
2013 and to ~27.21 percentage points in 2014. 
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Table 2: First stage DiD estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. var.:  HH_2MB HH_2MB HH_6MB HH_6MB HH_16MB HH_16MB 
Sample: Whole  Matched & 
Weighted 
Whole  Matched & 
Weighted 
Whole  Matched & 
Weighted 
Static Model       
ATE/ATT 17.1569*** 16.7563*** 23.7151*** 23.2355*** 20.9038*** 20.2103*** 
 (23.39) (22.04) (27.82) (25.71) (23.76) (19.88) 
 
      
Dynamic Model       
ATE/ATT 2012 13.8541*** 13.6111*** 18.9725*** 18.7469*** 16.1000*** 15.4308*** 
 (19.63) (18.56) (22.29) (21.36) (17.53) (14.48) 
 
      
ATE/ATT 2013 17.4633*** 17.2047*** 23.8157*** 23.5227*** 20.5130*** 19.9361*** 
 (21.47) (20.79) (24.84) (23.33) (20.41) (17.25) 
 
      
ATE/ATT 2014 20.1909*** 19.3537*** 28.3151*** 27.2138*** 26.4073*** 25.2467*** 
 (22.54) (21.05) (26.56) (24.16) (22.62) (19.24) 
# Obs. 9,425 8,120 9,425 8,120 9,425 8,120 
t-statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level and robust to heteroscedasticity. In the matched case we used the Stata 13 pweight option. The complete 
estimation results for the matched & weighted sample can be found in Table A.5. 
6.2.1 Assessing the parallel trend assumption 
The key identifying assumption underlying the DiD estimator is the parallel trend assumption. 
Although the latter is not directly testable, the assumption can be investigated using pre-
treatment data for both groups of treated and untreated municipalities. Figure 5 provides 
strong visual evidence of a common underlying trend for the pre-treatment period from 2005 
to 2009 where data is available for 1 Mbit/sec broadband coverage. Moreover, if we compare 
the left-hand and right-hand graph, we can infer that the remaining differences between 
treated and untreated municipalities are even further reduced if we focus on matched 
municipalities only (right-hand graph). This provides a reasonable justification for our 
preference of the conditional DiD approach on the basis of the matched sample.  
 
Figure 5: Trends in years preceding treatment for all (left panel) and  
matched municipalities only (right panel) 
Data Source: “Breitbandatlas” 
From Figure 5 we also infer that there is no apparent evidence of Ashenfelter’s pre-treatment 
dip (see Ashenfelter, 1978) for aid-receiving municipalities – which might have occurred in 
view of expectations related to the institutional design and gradual development of the 
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funding schemes in Bavaria. However, on the basis of the visual evidence in Figure 5, we can 
conclude that potential crowding-out effects and overestimation bias should be of secondary 
importance (if relevant at all). However, in the beginning of the pretreatment period (2010) 
the observed substantial differences in higher bandwidth levels (Figure 2) suggest some 
differences in pretreatment trends. Accordingly, we also control for higher bandwidth levels 
in 2010 in constructing the control group in PSM.  
6.2.2 Assessing the treatment effect with PSM  
We further investigate whether the treatment effects are similar on the basis of a pure PSM 
procedure which rests upon a different key identifying assumption. Whereas PSM does not 
require parallel trends, it assumes that conditional on pre-treatment outcomes confounding 
unobservables are irrelevant (‘selection is on observables’). 
The lower part of Table 1 reports the broadband outcome values for aid-receiving 
municipalities and different control groups with two (2NB) and three (3NB) nearest 
neighbors. The differences in average outcome variables of the treated municipalities are 
statistically significant according to two-sided t-tests throughout all definitions and for both 
counterfactual groups. For instance, the treatment effect is 81.90 - 65.99 = 15.91, if we 
compare the 2 Mbit/sec broadband coverage of the treated municipalities with the 
counterfactual group with 2 nearest neighbors in the year 2012. The respective value is quite 
similar to the respective DiD coefficient reported in Table 2: (13.85 for the whole and 13.61 
for the matched & weighted sample) – which also applies to the other bandwidth quality 
levels for both control groups: DiD and PSM based point estimates range from 13.85 to 28.31 
(Table 2:) and 12.19 to 28.28 (Table A.6), respectively. From Table A.6 we also see that 
estimated ATE and ATT again become more effective if we allow for a longer post-treatment 
period and for higher bandwidth levels.  
Overall, treatment analysis on the basis of PSM points to rather similar estimates in terms of 
magnitude, dynamics and bandwidth levels providing further arguments for the robustness of 
our first stage estimation results.  
6.3 Second stage: The impact of broadband deployment on employment  
The second stage of our empirical analysis examines the impact of broadband deployment on 
employment-related outcome variables which are reported in Table 3 in columns (1a)-(4c).17 
The employment variables in columns (1a)-(3c) are measured as a fraction of 100 residents, 
whereas average workers´ gross wages in columns (4a)-(4c) are measured in € per year. 
Similar to Section 6.2, we report the estimation results in Table 3 on the basis of the whole as 
well as matched and weighted samples. 
The broadband coverage in our model is endogenous with respect to the share of employees at 
place of residence (EMPL_RES) as well as for the share of employees at place of work 
(EMPL_WORK) as the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests reject the null hypothesis of 
broadband coverage being an exogenous variable in columns (1a)-(2c) for all broadband 
                                                     
17 The estimation results for the full models are available from the authors upon request. For columns (1a)-(1c), 
the full specifications can be found in the Table A.7. 
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quality levels. In turn, this is not the case for the other outcome variables (EMP_SELF and 
WAGE). OLS estimates for the full specifications of all employment outcomes are reported in 
Table A.8 and A.9. to deal with endogeneity underlying the specifications in columns (1a)-
(2c), we employ the interaction term (D1D2) of the first stage as our source of exogenous 
variation. First stage F-statistics of excluded instruments and the Cragg-Donald Wald (CDW) 
F-statistic, which clearly exceeds the IV critical value by Stock and Yogo (2005) for all 
dependent variables and quality levels, suggest that our instrument is strong and explains the 
broadband coverage very well.  
As revealed by Table 3, with the exception of the employees measured at the place of 
residence variable (EMPL_RES), we do not find any significantly positive impact of 
broadband coverage on employment outcome variables.18 This finding is at least partly in line 
with existing empirical evidence also struggling to find supportive evidence for overall 
significant labor market effects.  
Our results suggest that the benefit of increasing broadband coverage in rural areas is visible 
only with respect to employment measured at place of residence. Taking, for example, the 
coefficient of HH_6MB (0.0062) in column (1b) and multiplying it with the coefficient from 
the first stage (23.2355 in Table 3) yields an overall value of 0.144, suggesting that the number 
of employees with social insurance at place of residence increased by about 0.14 percent 
points. Multiplied with the average size of treated municipalities in the pre-treatment year 
2010 (50.0420) results in 7.2091, meaning on average about 7 additional persons with jobs 
with social insurance in each municipality that received the state aid. Multiplying this result 
with the total number of municipalities that received aid (1129) results in 8,139 additional 
jobs at place of residence. This key result suggests that households and the respective 
individuals remain in (or move to) rural areas to live (but not to work) there if basic 
broadband coverage is present – a finding well in line with recent evidence reported in 
Ahlfeldt et al. (2016). There, the authors estimate consumers´ valuation of broadband speed 
via house prices and find an elasticity of property prices with respect to internet speed of 
about 3%. Their data covers similar ranges of basic broadband connections and underlines the 
residential importance of broadband (although this effect is more relevant in urban areas).  
Last but not least, the fact that increased broadband coverage in treated municipalities did not 
induce additional jobs measured at place of work – but only jobs at place of residence – 
suggests further that a basic internet infrastructure makes activities such as tele-working or 
commuting to other (more urban) municipalities more attractive for some of the working age 
people living in rural areas. In other words, it can be concluded that although we do not find 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that state aid has a significant impact on closing the 
economic divide, it is found to have a significantly positive effect on the closing of the digital 
divide between urban and rural areas in the German state of Bavaria. Furthermore, if an 
additional political aim of broadband state aid was seen in the avoidance of a further 
                                                     
18
  Table A.8 in the Annex reports significant and positive coefficient estimates also for self-employment 
(EMPL_SELF) and gross annual wages (WAGE) in OLS specifications; however, the magnitudes of related 
marginal effects are negligible.  
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depopulation of rural areas, our results provide evidence that state aid has significantly 
contributed reaching this aim.  
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Table 3: Second stage IV estimation results 
 (1a)  (1b)  (1c)  (2a)  (2b)  (2c)  (3a)  (3b)  (3c)  (4a)  (4b)  (4c)  


















WAGE WAGE WAGE 
Matched & 
Weighted 
            
HH_2MB 0.0086***   0.0123   0.0003   1.7615   
 (3.15)   (1.32)   (0.91)   (0.99)   
             
HH_6MB  0.0062***   0.0089   0.0002   1.2726  
  (3.15)   (1.32)   (0.91)   (0.99)  
             
HH_16MB   0.0071***   0.0101   0.0002   1.4554 
   (3.13)   (1.32)   (0.91)   (0.99) 
# Obs. 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 
# Groups 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624  1,624 1,624 1,624  
F (excl. instr). 755.81 1041.29 633.63 755.81 1041.29 633.63 755.81 1041.29 633.63 755.81 1041.29 633.63 
F 634.48 634.27 626.20 56.97 57.18 57.02 274.86 274.82 274.48 158.99 158.64 158.48 
CDW F  368.881 480.138 354.151 368.881 480.138 354.151 368.881 480.138 354.151 524.32 660.93 84.20 
DWH 0.0103 0.0047 0.0011 0.0467 0.0381 0.0621 0.9028 0.8941 0.5302 0.8110 0.8294 0.6799 
R2 0.702 0.702 0.697 0.146  0.148  0.146 0.431 0.431 0.430 0.402 0.401 0.401 
Whole sample             
HH_2MB 0.0082***   0.0087   0.0003   0.8400   
 (3.70)   (1.48)   (1.27)   (0.49)   
             
HH_6MB  0.0059***   0.0063   0.0002   0.6085  
  (3.70)   (1.48)   (1.27)   (0.49)  
             
HH_16MB   0.0067***   0.0071   0.0003   0.6867 
   (3.69)   (1.48)   (1.27)   (0.49) 
# Obs. 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 9,425 
# Groups 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624  1,624 1,624 1,624  
F excl. instr. 897.48 1235.33 882.85 897.48 1235.33 882.85 897.48 1235.33 882.85 897.48 1235.33 882.85 
F 753.96 754.41 746.96 71.42 71.61 71.61 331.25 331.01 330.54 172.44 172.42 172.42 
CDW F  748.021 989.249 726.298 748.021 989.249 726.298 748.021 989.249 726.298 748.02 989.25 726.30 
DWH 0.0042 0.0013 0.0002 0.0118 0.0131 0.0662 0.8378 0.7796 0.3756 0.9263 0.7366 0.8419 
R2 0.686 0.686 0.683 0.153 0.155 0.155 0.412 0.411 0.410 0.350 0.350 0.350 
t-statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroscedasticity. All regressions include 
fixed effects for year, municipality and controls of equation (1) as well as a covariate measuring education (EDUC).  
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7 Summary and conclusions 
In May 2012, the European Commission announced its State Aid Modernization (SAM) 
reform aiming at fostering growth in the internal market through streamlined rules and faster 
decisions. “State aid control should more effectively target sustainable growth-enhancing 
policies while encouraging budgetary consolidation, limiting distortions of competition and 
keeping the single market open” (European Commission, 2012, p. 4). Interestingly, in 
working towards these goals, the Commission’s strategy does not only envisage the 
identification of common principles for assessing the compatibility of aid with the internal 
market – in combination with the creation or revision of guidelines and frameworks – but it 
explicitly includes an ex-post evaluation program as key tool to ensure an effective EU State 
aid policy (see European Commission, 2014).  
In this paper, we provide such an ex-post evaluation for the example of a major state aid 
program for broadband deployment in rural areas in the German State of Bavaria. Using a 
unique micro panel data set, we evaluate the causal effect of state aid that was granted in the 
period from 2010 to 2011 to in sum 1,300 municipalities. Our post-treatment period refers to 
the years from 2012 to 2014. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy on the 
basis of a matched sample of 1,845 aided and non-aided rural municipalities, we first 
examined – from an effectivity perspective – the question whether the granting of state aid 
had the desired direct effect. Our treatment analysis revealed that state aid indeed had an 
impact on the municipalities treated as they have significantly higher coverage in broadband 
than comparable non-aided municipalities. In particular, we found that the aided 
municipalities have – depending on broadband quality – a between 16.8 and 23.2 percent 
higher broadband coverage than non-aided municipalities. Our results further suggest that the 
effect of state aid is more pronounced for higher bandwidth levels and that it gains strength 
over the years after treatment.  
Second – from an efficiency perspective – we examined whether the additional broadband 
coverage also carried over to socially desirable indirect effects in terms of creating new jobs. 
We found that state aid-induced higher broadband coverage generated significantly positive 
employment effects with respect to the number of employees at place of residence only. 
Based on an average bandwidth level (6 Mbit/sec), we found that in sum 8,139 additional 
individuals with social insurance were induced by the broadband state aid program in the 
years 2010 to 2011 to live in the treated Bavarian municipalities. Furthermore, our empirical 
results also suggest that more people decided to move into treated municipalities than left 
these rural areas – indicating that an improved broadband coverage makes these 
municipalities more valuable places to live. In that sense, the funding program successfully 
served as a mean to prevent rural municipalities from depopulation – however, it does not 
impose a measurable effect on the closing of the economic divide in the form of creating new 
jobs in these municipalities.  
Coming back to the main policy-related question – already raised in the title of the article – 
namely whether state aid can help in bridging the digital and economic divide, our empirical 
results for the State of Bavaria support the conclusion that state aid programs can be an 
effective instrument to foster broadband deployment in particularly rural areas. When it 
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comes to the subsequent efficiency question of such investments, our result of in sum 8,139 
additional individuals with social insurance being induced to live in the treated Bavarian 
municipalities may – on the surface – appear modest compared to the total amount of 
€107.6m of state aid provided by the public authorities to the respective municipalities. 
However, a closer look reveals that such a simple comparison of benefits and costs would be 
superficial for at least two reasons: On the one hand, as it ignores further positive knock-on 
effects of an improved broadband coverage on, e.g., innovation or economic growth, that are 
expected to be generated in the longer run. On the other hand, such a simple comparison 
ignores the additional (counterfactual) costs that would have been created by an accelerating 
digital and economic divide between urban and rural areas that might have occurred in the 
absence of the respective state aid program. Such aspects need to be investigated as part of 
future research – in working towards well-founded conclusions on effective and efficient 
ways to bridge the digital and economic divide.   
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Annex 
Table A.1: Description of variables and sources 
Variable55544 Description Source 
Variable Description Source 
Outcome variables stage 1 
HH_XMB Share of households with at least XMB fixed-line broadband 




Outcome variables stage 2 
EMPL_RES Number of employees with social insurance, municipality level 
at place of residence per 100 residents (2010-2014) 
GENESIS 
EMPL_WORK Number of employees with social insurance, municipality level 
at place of work per 100 residents (2010-2014) 
GENESIS 
EMPL_SELF Number of self-employed workers and freelancers, municipality 
level per 100 residents (2010-2014) 
ACXIOM 




D1 Dummy on whether a municipality received state aid between 
2010 and 2011, municipality level 
Schnelles Internet  
für Bayern 
Control variables 
HH Number of households, municipality level (2010) Micro Census 2011 
GR_RENT Annual growth in rents, municipality level (2007-2009) IDN Immo  
Daten GmbH 
GR_1MB Average yearly growth rate in the share of households with 
access to 1MB, municipality level (2007-2009) 
Breitbandatlas/ 
TÜV Rheinland 
TYPE_X Municipality type, indicator of how rural a municipality is 
(2010) 
INKAR 
FEMALE Share of female inhabitants, municipality level (2010-2014)  GENESIS 
WORKING_AGE Share of people in working age, i.e., 18 to 65 years, 
municipality level (2010-2014) 
INKAR 
POP_DENS Population density per square kilometer, municipality level 
(2010-2013)**) 
GENESIS 
GVA_SEC Share of gross value added in secondary sector, county level 
(2010-2013)**) 
INKAR 
GVA_TER Share of gross value added in tertiary sector, county level 
(2010-2013)**) 
INKAR 
FIRM_MED Share of firms with 50 to 250 employees, county level (2010-
2013)**) 
INKAR 
FIRM_BIG Share of firms with more than 250 employees, county level 
(2010-2013)**) 
INKAR 
CSU Share of the CSU party in the municipal election (2008-2014) GENESIS 
SPD Share of the SPD party in the municipal election (2008-2014) GENESIS 
ACC_MOTOR Average journey time (car) in minutes to the next motorway, 
municipality level (2010, 2012-2014)*) 
INKAR 
ACC_CITIES Average journey time (car) in minutes to the next regional 
metropolitan area, municipality level (2010, 2012-2014)*) 
INKAR 
EDUC Percentage share of school leavers with a higher education entry 
qualification in the total number of school leavers, county level 
(2010-2013)**) 
INKAR 
Notes: *) Missing values for 2011 were calculated using linear interpolation. **) In case control variables were 
only available up to the year 2013, we have extrapolated them to the year 2014. 
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Table A.2: Summary statistics  
 # Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Min. Max. 
HH_2MB 9,425 80.351 26.727 0.000 100.000 
HH_6MB 9,425 66.734 32.788 0.000 100.000 
HH_16MB 9,425 50.150 34.103 0.000 100.000 
EMPL_RES 9,425 38.234 3.517 21.463 52.522 
EMPL_WORK 9,425 22.759 18.457 0.930 200.573 
EMPL_SELF  9,425 3.369 1.147 0.558 8.150 
WAGE 9,425 25520.433 4318.374 13662.086 83865.617 
D1 9,425 0.599 0.490 0.000 1.000 
EDUC 9,425 25.965 9.796 8.900 70.300 
WORKING_AGE 9,425 63.289 2.135 52.800 70.700 
GR_RENT 9,425 2.288 2.803 0.000 5.885 
GR_1MB 9,425 1.363 5.465 -42.855 50.000 
TYPE_1 9,425 0.003 0.056 0.000 1.000 
TYPE_2 9,425 0.029 0.168 0.000 1.000 
TYPE_3 9,425 0.077 0.266 0.000 1.000 
TYPE_4 9,425 0.266 0.442 0.000 1.000 
TYPE_5 9,425 0.624 0.484 0.000 1.000 
HH 9,425 2.760 18.552 0.088 732.793 
FEMALE 9,425 50.111 1.418 36.100 56.700 
POP_DENS 9,425 189.626 292.660 6.000 4531.200 
FIRM_MED 9,425 15.325 3.754 8.200 40.200 
FIRM_BIG 9,425 2.570 0.941 0.480 7.470 
GVA_SEC 9,425 37.908 9.601 12.800 71.700 
GVA_TER 9,425 60.227 9.710 26.800 86.500 
CSU 9,425 0.246 0.205 0.000 1.000 
SPD 9,425 0.109 0.130 0.000 0.663 
ACC_MOTOR 9,425 14.662 10.790 0.000 69.000 
ACC_CITIES 9,425 29.029 14.172 0.000 82.300 
  
28 
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of the used samples / sample means before matching 
 Control group   Aid-receiving 
municipalities 
 Results of t-test on mean 
differences  
 N=756  N=1,129    
 mean S.D.  mean S.D.  Diff t-value 
Covariates         
HH_2MB_ 2010 79.96 26.54  58.94 33.02  *** (15.26) 
HH_6MB_ 2010 64.60 31.80  39.75 33.68  *** (16.23) 
HH_16MB_2010 39.25 32.89  24.62 28.83  *** (9.94) 
GR_RENT 0.05 0.02  0.05 0.02   (-1.29) 
GR_1MB 5.43 5.65  5.27 4.91   (0.66) 
HH 3.44 27.47  2.31 8.34   (1.10) 
WORKING_AGE 62.52 2.21  62.93 1.91  *** (-4.22) 
FEMALE 50.35 1.49  49.97 1.53  *** (5.32) 
POP_DENS 239.50 396.52  157.27 186.10  *** (5.32) 
TYPE _1 0.01 0.07  0.00 0.04   (1.20) 
TYPE _2 0.03 0.17  0.03 0.17   (0.26) 
TYPE _3 0.07 0.26  0.08 0.27   (-0.56) 
TYPE _4 0.23 0.42  0.29 0.46  *** (-3.29) 
TYPE _5 0.67 0.47  0.60 0.49  *** (3.03) 
FIRM_MED 14.70 3.81  14.89 3.62   (-1.11) 
FIRM_BIG 2.38 0.89  2.43 0.91   (-1.25) 
GVA_SEC 36.42 10.34  37.74 9.36  *** (-2.83) 
GVA_TER 61.80 10.47  60.48 9.43  *** (2.79) 
CSU 0.26 0.20  0.24 0.21  *** (2.83) 
SPD 0.13 0.14  0.10 0.12  *** (4.35) 
ACC_MOTOR 12.98 9.21  15.84 11.55  *** (-5.95) 
ACC_CITIES 28.77 14.65  31.97 14.92  *** (-4.62) 
Outcome variables         
HH_2MB_ 2012 82.58 24.36  80.55 26.04  * (1.72) 
HH_2MB_ 2013 86.07 21.64  87.82 19.97  * (-1.77) 
HH_2MB_ 2014 87.54 20.51  92.09 14.44  *** (-5.28) 
HH_6MB_ 2012 67.63 30.67  68.23 31.67   (-0.41) 
HH_6MB_ 2013 72.20 29.39  77.82 27.17  *** (-4.19) 
HH_6MB_ 2014 74.58 28.70  84.76 20.93  *** (-8.38) 
HH_16MB_2012 50.90 30.80  57.09 32.25  *** (-4.20) 
HH_16MB_2013 50.98 32.51  61.70 30.76  *** (-7.17) 
HH_16MB_2014 55.91 32.56  72.60 27.05  *** (-11.66) 





Table A.4: Probit regression results 
Dep. var  
(Pr(D1 = 1)) Coefficient Standard error 
   
HH_2MB_ 2010 -0.0034 (-1.68) 
   
HH_6MB_ 2010 -0.0163*** (-6.98) 
   
HH_16MB_2010 0.0054** (3.08) 
   
GR_RENT 0.7224 (0.64) 
   
GR_1MB -0.0152 (-1.90) 
   
HH 0.0025 (0.96) 
   
WORKING_AGE 0.0686*** (4.08) 
   
FEMALE -0.0221 (-0.91) 
   
POP_DENS -0.0008*** (-4.13) 
   
TYPE _1 0.8892 (1.14) 
   
TYPE _2 1.1595*** (5.26) 
   
TYPE _3 0.9295*** (6.79) 
   
TYPE _4 0.6179*** (7.81) 
   
TYPE _5 0.0000 (.) 
   
FIRM_MED 0.0015 (0.12) 
   
FIRM_BIG 0.0114 (0.21) 
   
GVA_SEC 0.1517** (3.16) 
   
GVA_TER 0.1481** (3.08) 
   
CSU 0.0558 (0.32) 
   
SPD -0.2006 (-0.68) 
   
ACC_MOTOR 0.0110** (2.89) 
   
ACC_CITIES 0.0028 (1.02) 
   
Constant -17.1135*** (-3.34) 
   








Table A.5: Static and dynamic DiD models with controls based on matched and weighted sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. var.: HH_2MB HH_2MB HH_6MB HH_6MB HH_16MB HH_16MB 
ATE 16.7563***  23.2355***  20.2103***  
 (22.04)  (25.71)  (19.88)  
       
ATE 1 year post  13.6111***  18.7469***  15.4308*** 
  (18.56)  (21.36)  (14.48) 
       
ATE 2 year post  17.2047***  23.5227***  19.9361*** 
  (20.79)  (23.33)  (17.25) 
       
ATE 3 year post  19.3537***  27.2138***  25.2467*** 
  (21.05)  (24.16)  (19.24) 
       
WORKING_AGE 4.3977*** 3.7082*** 4.6779*** 3.3789*** 3.4330*** 2.7544*** 
 (7.24) (5.81) (6.72) (4.71) (5.05) (3.91) 
       
FEMALE 0.5471 0.8411 0.6550 1.1871 0.6518 1.1986 
 (0.77) (1.18) (0.83) (1.50) (0.89) (1.63) 
       
POP_DENS -0.0799** -0.0883** -0.0914** -0.1100** -0.0458 -0.0475 
 (-2.08) (-2.16) (-1.98) (-2.16) (-1.07) (-1.09) 
       
FIRM_MED 2.3316*** 1.6017*** 3.0448*** 1.6284*** 2.4527*** 1.8246*** 
 (5.46) (3.32) (6.00) (2.89) (4.92) (3.30) 
       
FIRM_BIG 6.9912*** 5.4900*** 8.9559*** 5.9642*** 8.0731*** 6.8768*** 
 (4.13) (3.06) (4.46) (2.82) (3.97) (3.19) 
       
L.GVA_SEC -4.2449*** -3.0847** -7.5940*** -5.1696*** -5.5065*** -5.7733*** 
 (-2.87) (-2.00) (-4.35) (-2.84) (-3.14) (-3.17) 
       
L.GVA_TER -5.0014*** -3.8309** -8.6717*** -6.2355*** -6.8736*** -7.0870*** 
 (-3.35) (-2.47) (-4.92) (-3.39) (-3.87) (-3.84) 
       
CSU -1.9837 -0.6329 -6.7633 -4.4937 -8.8715 -6.0305 
 (-0.35) (-0.11) (-1.05) (-0.71) (-1.36) (-0.95) 
       
SPD 8.2660 15.2402** 0.1855 12.5843 0.3622 16.0559 
 (1.27) (2.25) (0.02) (1.40) (0.03) (1.52) 
       
ACC_MOTOR -0.1248 -0.0507 -0.2615 -0.0983 0.0641 0.0918 
 (-0.41) (-0.18) (-0.54) (-0.21) (0.13) (0.19) 
       
ACC_CITIES -0.0339 0.0180 -0.0746 0.0283 -0.0594 -0.0174 
 (-0.86) (0.43) (-1.32) (0.46) (-0.97) (-0.26) 
       
Post treatment  -3.5423***  -4.1776***  1.8005**  
period (-6.44)  (-6.48)  (2.26)  
       
YEAR 2012  -1.6398***  -1.7626***  5.0874*** 
  (-3.88)  (-3.83)  (6.78) 
       
YEAR 2013  -3.0763***  -2.3610**  -0.3720 
  (-3.27)  (-2.12)  (-0.31) 
       
YEAR 2014  -1.4917  0.1637  4.5042*** 
  (-1.50)  (0.14)  (3.42) 
       
Constant 194.3866 120.6963 495.0074** 335.4202* 367.5307* 414.2523** 
 (1.14) (0.70) (2.53) (1.69) (1.89) (2.10) 
# Obs. 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 
R2 within 0.2673 0.3370 0.2949 0.3957 0.3151 0.4170 
F-Test 88.44 74.24 121.90 102.86 150.81 130.06 
t-statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level. All regressions include municipality fixed effects. The share of GVA in the secondary and tertiary sector 
was lagged (L.GVA) to avoid reverse causality. 
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Table A.6: Immediate and long-term treatment effects for PSM 
 (2NB) (3NB) 
Dep. var.: HH_2MB HH_6MB HH_16MB HH_2MB HH_6MB HH_16MB 
       
ATE 2012 12.19*** 18.29*** 18.16*** 12.56*** 18.30*** 18.26*** 
 (9.58) (14.65) (14.37) (11.35) (16.37) (16.01) 
       
ATT 2012 15.91*** 22.60*** 21.77*** 16.56*** 22.70*** 21.79*** 
 (8.29) (12.73) (12.88) (10.14) (14.68) (14.73) 
       
ATE 2013 12.96*** 21.08*** 20.07*** 13.47*** 21.45*** 20.52*** 
 (11.43) (17.02) (15.38) (13.30) (19.42) (17.55) 
       
ATT 2013 16.92*** 26.13*** 23.37*** 17.58*** 26.50*** 23.76*** 
 (9.88) (14.76) (13.26) (11.74) (17.25) (15.52) 
       
ATE 2014 13.24*** 22.37*** 23.54*** 13.86*** 22.82*** 23.86*** 
 (13.76) (19.94) (17.81) (13.76) (19.76) (17.94) 
       
ATT 2014 17.11*** 27.70*** 27.37*** 18.01*** 28.28*** 27.85*** 
 (12.04) (18.07) (16.44) (12.02) (17.62) (16.31) 
       
# Obs. 1,833 1,833 1,833 1,833 1,833 1,833 
t-statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level and robust to heteroscedasticity. 
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Table A.7: Second stage full IV/2SLS model with matched and weighted sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. var.: EMPL_RES EMPL_RES EMPL_RES 
HH_2MB 0.0086***   
 (3.15)   
    
HH_6MB  0.0062***  
  (3.15)  
    
HH_16MB   0.0071*** 
   (3.13) 
    
WORKING_AGE -0.0670** -0.0569* -0.0538* 
 (-2.09) (-1.82) (-1.73) 
    
FEMALE 0.1012** 0.1007** 0.1003** 
 (2.20) (2.17) (2.15) 
    
POP_DENS -0.0226*** -0.0227*** -0.0231*** 
 (-3.40) (-3.40) (-3.44) 
    
FIRM_MED -0.0245 -0.0223 -0.0217 
 (-1.01) (-0.92) (-0.89) 
    
FIRM_BIG 0.1330* 0.1394* 0.1376* 
 (1.82) (1.92) (1.88) 
    
L.GVA_SEC 0.1699** 0.1782** 0.1805** 
 (2.01) (2.11) (2.13) 
    
L.GVA_TER 0.1690** 0.1781** 0.1815** 
 (1.97) (2.08) (2.11) 
    
CSU 0.3580 0.3813 0.3967 
 (0.75) (0.81) (0.84) 
    
SPD -0.4596 -0.4095 -0.4480 
 (-0.97) (-0.85) (-0.92) 
    
ACC_MOTOR -0.0032 -0.0029 -0.0045 
 (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.35) 
    
ACC_CITIES 0.0041** 0.0042** 0.0043** 
 (1.99) (2.01) (2.08) 
    
EDUC -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0010 
 (-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.17) 
# Obs. 8,120 8,120 8,120 
R2 0.702 0.702 0.697 
F 634.48 634.27 626.20 
F-Test of excl. instr. 755.81 1041.29 633.63 
DWH 0.0103 0.0047 0.0011 
t-statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level. All regressions include fixed effects for year, municipality and controls of equation (1) as well as 
education (EDUC). The share of GVA in the secondary and tertiary sector was lagged (L.GVA) to avoid reverse 
causality.
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Table A.8: Second stage OLS estimates for self-employment and gross wages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. var.: SELF SELF SELF WAGE WAGE WAGE 












HH_2MB 0.0003**   1.3524**   
 (2.22)   (2.52)   
 
      
HH_6MB 
 0.0002*   1.0131**  
 
 (1.91)   (2.33)  
 
      
HH_16MB 
  0.0001   0.8739** 
 
  (0.90)   (2.16) 
       
WORKING_AGE -0.0088* -0.0085* -0.0081* -36.1891* -34.6957* -33.5371 
 (-1.88) (-1.81) (-1.73) (-1.78) (-1.70) (-1.65) 
       
FEMALE 0.0126** 0.0126** 0.0127*** 35.0609 34.9465 35.1765 
 (2.57) (2.57) (2.59) (1.31) (1.31) (1.32) 
       
POP_DENS -0.0033*** -0.0033*** -0.0033*** 1.5518 1.5495 1.4703 
 (-3.37) (-3.37) (-3.37) (0.58) (0.58) (0.56) 
       
FIRM_MED 0.0075* 0.0075* 0.0074* 1.8661 2.2388 2.0960 
 (1.72) (1.73) (1.71) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) 
       
FIRM_BIG 0.0229** 0.0231** 0.0230** -24.9602 -23.9392 -24.2326 
 (2.01) (2.03) (2.02) (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.49) 
       
L.GVA_SEC 0.0238* 0.0240* 0.0240* -133.3653*** -132.0566*** -131.8256*** 
 (1.94) (1.96) (1.96) (-2.70) (-2.68) (-2.67) 
       
L.GVA_TER 0.0247** 0.0250** 0.0250** -143.9100*** -142.4625*** -142.1500*** 
 (1.98) (2.00) (2.00) (-2.82) (-2.79) (-2.79) 
       
CSU -0.0476 -0.0469 -0.0474 204.9707 208.8540 209.3233 
 (-1.15) (-1.14) (-1.15) (0.62) (0.63) (0.63) 
       
SPD -0.1385** -0.1370** -0.1353** 491.4961 498.7508 498.5980 
 (-2.07) (-2.05) (-2.03) (1.00) (1.01) (1.01) 
       
ACC_MOTOR -0.0045** -0.0045** -0.0045** 3.1267 3.1553 3.0204 
 (-2.37) (-2.36) (-2.35) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) 
       
ACC_CITIES -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -2.8229** -2.8252** -2.7786** 
 (-3.01) (-3.02) (-2.98) (-2.10) (-2.08) (-2.04) 
       
EDUC -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -4.7151 -4.6833 -4.5510 
 (-1.57) (-1.55) (-1.47) (-1.61) (-1.60) (-1.55) 
       
Constant 1.3255 1.2869 1.2662 39044.33*** 38849.2784*** 38773.618*** 
 (1.03) (0.99) (0.98) (7.41) (7.38) (7.36) 
# Obs. 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 
R2 0.431 0.431 0.430 0.402 0.401 0.401 
F 201.83 202.41 202.79 155.27 156.03 155.25 
t-statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level and robust to heteroscedasticity. The share of GVA in the secondary and tertiary sector was lagged 
(L.GVA) to avoid reverse causality.  
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Table A.9: Second stage OLS estimates for employees at place of residence and place of work 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























HH_2MB 0.0020**   -0.0055**   
 (2.18)   (-2.29)   
 
   
   
HH_6MB  0.0010   -0.0045**  
  (1.37)   (-2.26)  
 
   
   
HH_16MB   0.0000   -0.0040** 
   (0.01)   (-1.99) 
 
      
WORKING_AGE -0.0443 -0.0405 -0.0375 -0.3002*** -0.3051*** -0.3100*** 
 (-1.29) (-1.17) (-1.08) (-3.29) (-3.35) (-3.41) 
 
      
FEMALE 0.1062** 0.1066** 0.1077** 0.1109 0.1117 0.1108 
 (1.99) (1.99) (2.01) (0.80) (0.80) (0.80) 
 
      
POP_DENS -0.0231*** -0.0232*** -0.0233*** -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0110 
 (-3.03) (-3.02) (-3.02) (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.83) 
 
      
FIRM_MED -0.0272 -0.0270 -0.0278 0.0554 0.0535 0.0538 
 (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.99) (0.59) (0.57) (0.57) 
 
      
FIRM_BIG 0.1363 0.1376 0.1373 0.4546* 0.4503* 0.4516* 
 (1.57) (1.59) (1.59) (1.88) (1.86) (1.86) 
 
      
L.GVA_SEC 0.1745* 0.1762* 0.1759* 0.1102 0.1046 0.1034 
 (1.81) (1.83) (1.82) (0.41) (0.39) (0.39) 
 
      
L.GVA_TER 0.1729* 0.1748* 0.1742* 0.1068 0.1005 0.0989 
 (1.76) (1.78) (1.77) (0.40) (0.38) (0.37) 
 
      
CSU 0.3491 0.3517 0.3463 -1.0773 -1.0950 -1.0976 
 (0.68) (0.69) (0.68) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-0.89) 
 
      
SPD -0.3333 -0.3132 -0.2956 -0.0223 -0.0450 -0.0423 
 (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.60) (-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.03) 
 
      
ACC_MOTOR -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0017 0.0855* 0.0854* 0.0860* 
 (-0.13) (-0.12) (-0.11) (1.84) (1.84) (1.86) 
 
      
ACC_CITIES 0.0046* 0.0047* 0.0047* -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0019 
 (1.87) (1.90) (1.93) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.26) 
 
      
EDUC 0.0020 0.0022 0.0026 0.0197 0.0201 0.0201 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.35) (0.87) (0.88) (0.87) 
 
      
Constant 20.6965** 20.3369** 20.2021* 23.5553 24.3033 24.6329 
 (2.01) (1.97) (1.96) (0.77) (0.80) (0.81) 
# Obs. 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 
R2 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.157 0.157 0.157 
F 404.11 402.40 400.14 38.77 38.80 38.83 
t-statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level and robust to heteroscedasticity. The share of GVA in the secondary and tertiary sector was lagged 
(L.GVA) to avoid reverse causality.   
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